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The Shadow in the Comments Section:
Revealing Anonymous Online Users in the Social
Media Age
ABSTRACT

In 2018, the world is no longer outside our windows, but ratherit isjust
behindthe screens of our laptops, tablets, or smartphones. This modern shift
in how our society conducts itselfopened the door to a distinct sub-breedof
humanity." the cyber bully, the "troll," the troubled person finding
therapeuticescape by attacking othersfrom the safety of a desk chair. The
ability to post anonymously empowers this portion of society to humiliate,
harass, and destroy the lives of others, often doing so with a disconnect
between the real world and online.
The harm caused by anonymous postings has made its way to the courts
numerous times. Plaintiffsseek retributionin some form, but in order to build
their case they mustfirst ascertain the identity of their abuser. The problem
is that the FirstAmendment of the Constitutionnot only protectsfree speech,
it also protects anonymous speech. Thus, courts must perform a balancing
act.: the interest in the right to speak anonymously versus a plaintiff's right
to seek redress. Courts have struggled applying this balance, and the result
has been a lack of consistency or certainty as to what a plaintiff and an
anonymous defendantcan expect in any given case. This Comment examines
past decisions applying this balance, the history behind the establishedright
to anonymous speech, andproposes a type-based method solution.

INTR ODU CTION ................................................................................. 226
I. ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO ANONYMITY AND ITS EVOLUTION
IN THE INTERNET ERA ............................................................ 228
II. DEFAMATION ACTIONS INVOLVING ANONYMOUS
D EFEND AN TS .......................................................................... 23 1

A. The Development of Defamation Law, First Amendment
Anonymity, and the Internet ........................................... 232
B. Capstone Standards for Uncovering Anonymous
Defendants in Defamation Suits ..................................... 233
1. The Dendrite "Prima Facie" Standard ...................... 234
2. The Cahill "Summary Judgment" Standard .............. 236

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2019

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7

226

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:225

239
3. The America Online "Good Faith" Standard ............
C. In re Anonymous Online Speakers: The Voice
241
of R eason .............................................
243
..................
FACTOR
DECIDING
OUTDATED
AN
VALUE:
III. SOCIAL
IV. MOVING FORWARD FROM ANONYMOUS ONLINE: THE "TYPE

246
M ETHOD"................................................
247
............................
A. Implementing the "Type Method"
B. Justifying the "Type Method" and Which Standard
Applies to W hich Speech Type....................................... 248
250
C ON CLU SION ..................................................

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of social media has changed the way society
Before social media, the major vehicles for mass
communicates.'
communication were large corporate newspapers and television companies
acting as "the press.",2 Now, social media provides an all-inclusive platform
3
from which anyone can speak to the entire world. Although social media
facilitates efficient and widespread communication across the world, it also
opens the door for people to abuse it at the expense of others. 4 Many people
use these platforms to harass, publicly humiliate, defame, and threaten
others, all while shielded by anonymity.5 Research shows that anonymity
1. See, e.g., Oscar Kimanuka, Social media has changed the way we communicate, NEW
TIMES (May 2, 2015), https://perma.cc/DTN5-9X87.
2. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("When the Framers thought of the press, they did not envision the large,
corporate newspaper and television establishments of our modem world.").
3. See David Squires, Social Media's Impact on Journalism, SOC. CONSTRUCTION OF
MEDIA (Oct. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/MW8W-47H2?type=image ("Today, the audience
expects to have a choice in what information they choose to read and most believe they should
have an active role in contributing to the content and voicing their opinions. Gone is the past
concept of 'media professional' that determines what the audience's needs are in readership.")
(citations omitted).
4. See Josh Logue, Who Should Prevent Social Media Harassment?, INSIDE HIGHER
EDUC. (Oct. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/CQX4-NAA6.
5. Since the early 2010s, anonymous social media has been used to issue threats of mass
violence on more than a dozen college campuses, including the University of North Carolina.
See UNC Chapel Hill police make arrest in social media threat, ABC 11 EYEWITNEss NEWS
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://perma.cc/7TF9-C3ZN. They have been used to post racist,
homophobic and misogynist comments, and even issue gang threats and propose rape. See
Jonathan Mahler, Who Spewed That Abuse? Anonymous Yik Yak App Isn't Telling, N.Y.
TrMEs (Mar. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/SJP9-7AM2.
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seems to be a catalyst for destructive behavior on social media platforms. 6
"When people believe their actions cannot be attributed directly to them
personally, they tend to become less inhibited by social conventions and
restraint." 7
Research indicates people are more likely to act destructively when they
do not perceive a threat of personal consequences.' The perception that
anonymity shields a person from consequences is why, for example, a mask
is often used as a tool to carry out criminal activity. 9 On traditional, nonanonymous social media platforms, people are still aware of the link between
their online actions and their real-world identity, which provides a level of
restraint. However, this deterrent is eliminated by anonymity.10
Issues arise when the constitutional right to anonymous speech is used
to illegally harass and defame others.11 The victims of anonymous
defamation must jump through various legal hurdles to ascertain the identity
of their abuser once they file a lawsuit. 2 In cases involving defamation, 3
courts are tasked with balancing the interest in protecting a defendant's right
to speak anonymously14 with the interest in protecting a plaintiffs right to
seek redress.' 5 Generally, this balancing act results in the courts applying

6. Michelle F. Wright, Predictors of Anonymous Cyber Aggression: The Role of
Adolescents' Beliefs About Anonymity, Aggression, and the Permanency of Digital Content,
17 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV., & Soc. NETWORKiNG 431, 435 (2014).
7. PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 103 (2d ed. 2016). This

concept is especially attractive to younger generations that have a naive disposition towards
sharing content, but who have also been warned about the permanence of their digital
footprint. Mahler, supra note 5.

8. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRVIES INCYBERSPACE 57-59 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); see also
Anonymity, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/GA7X-3R8X (last visited
December 10, 2018).
12. Kenneth Linzer, Courts Ill-Equipped to Police Cyber Threats and Cyberbullying in
the Anonymous Age, TECH CRUNCH (2014), https://perma.cc/K669-7KVX.
13. Defamation is defined as "[m]alicious or groundless harm to the reputation or good
name of another by the making of a false statement to a third person." Defamation, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. The Court has interpreted the First Amendment right to speak freely as also implicitly
encompassing the right to speak anonymously. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
15. Ryan M. Martin, Comment, Freezingthe Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-AllStandard
for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
1217, 1226-27 (2007). "[A] court attempting to determine when an anonymous speaker can
be unmasked for allegedly making defamatory statements should 'adopt a standard that
appropriately balances one person's right to speak anonymously against another person's right
to protect his reputation."' Id. (quoting Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005)).
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one of three capstone standards that set what requirements a plaintiff must
6 This is a problem
satisfy to reveal the anonymous defendant's identity.
because no court has a uniform method to determine which of the three
standards apply. The decision to choose a standard is often left to the
discretion of the presiding judge and his or her own perception of the value
7
of the speech at issue balanced against the interests of a plaintiff.' It is
therefore difficult for plaintiffs to predict the standard a court will apply.
This lack of structure ultimately serves as a disincentive to pursue viable
claims.
This Comment proposes a structured method for choosing the correct
standard requirements a plaintiff must satisfy to obtain the identity of an
anonymous defendant in an anonymous defamation suit. Part I will provide
an overview of the origins of the anonymity right as a facet of the First
Amendment and in the context of defamation. Part II will justify the need
for this proposed method by addressing the three standard sets of
requirements that this method will seek to apply in an appropriate and
consistent manner, highlighting the subjective and arbitrary determinations
courts have used to apply them in the past. In addition, it will briefly analyze
how one pivotal case implicitly opened the door for using a method of
8
application that is predicated on the type of speech the case concerns.1 Part
III will analyze how the struggle to balance the opposing interests at play has
led to the ever-changing social value of speech as the most determinative
factor in choosing the standard requirements for revealing anonymous
defendants. Finally, Part IV will conclude the analysis by expounding upon
the proposed type-based method to determine the applicable standard,
considering which types of speech will warrant certain standards, and
addressing solutions to potential problems this new categorical approach
may face.
I.

ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO ANONYMITY AND ITS EVOLUTION IN THE

INTERNET ERA
The right to speak anonymously finds its origin with the birth of the
9
United States as an independent nation and the creation of the Constitution.'
Although anonymous writing had been used as an expressive tool long

16. See Thomson v. Doe, 356 P.3d 727, 731-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); see also infra
Part II.B.
17. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2011).
18. Id. at 11.77.
19. See Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Cassandra Imfeld Jeyaram, OurFoundingAnonymity:
Anonymous Speech During the ConstitutionalDebate, 28 AM. JOURNALISM 35, 37-41 (2011).
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before the Revolutionary Era in the United States,2 ° anonymous writing
quickly became a staple of American culture in 1787 when congressional
delegates met and proposed the adoption of the United States Constitution. 1
This congressional proposal sparked a national debate between the
federalists who supported the Constitution and the anti-federalists who
opposed it. 22 During this national debate many manuscripts, newspaper
articles, and pamphlets were published anonymously in support of, and
against, ratifying the Constitution. 23 Anonymity and the use of pseudonyms
became a powerful tool for both sides of the debate and were widely used
for a number of reasons.24 Some of the same reasons for the use of
anonymous writing during the ratification debate have been used to justify
the protection of anonymity under the First Amendment in more recent case
law. 25

20. See Note, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the
Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1084-85 (1961).
21. See Ekstrand & Jeyaram, supra note 20, at 3 5- 36 .sjP
22. Id. at 36.
23. Id. at 35.
24. Id. at 37. Ekstrand and Jeyaram lay out six broad reasons for the use of anonymity
during the ratification debates. Id. They first argue that anonymity was utilized as essentially
a marketing tool due to the "longstanding European tradition for anonymous speech and a
long tradition of colonial support for anonymous pamphleteers." Id. Second, it was used to
establish a "rhetoric of fear" and preserving anonymity allowed writers to use more "forceful
and inflammatory" rhetoric against the opposition in order to spur on the emotionally charged
support rather than relying on the issues themselves. Id. at 40-41. The third more obvious
reason was for their own safety in public and protecting their reputations. Id. at 41. Fourth,
some author's desired that support for their side of the debate be genuine and rely on public
agreeance with the issues, therefore they remained anonymous in order to prevent the public
support to be based on support for the author as an individual or for their political affiliation.
Id. at 45. Fifth, some authors chose to use pseudonyms collectively, as a tool for forming a
core national identity apart from their own individual identities, for example key leaders, John
Jay, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, wrote together under the one pseudonym
"Publius." Id. at 47-48. In this same respect, it allowed the writers to further the nation's
unified identity by connecting the political debate of the time to the struggles of ancient
civilizations and to relay longstanding ideals and virtues of history's finest, such as "Caesar"
or "Mark Anthony." Id. at 47 (citing Eran Shalev, Ancient Masks, American Fathers:
ClassicalPseudonyms During the American Revolution and Early Republic, 23 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 151, 164 (2003)). Lastly, they argue that the writers utilized anonymity to further
build the "marketplace of ideas." Id. at 49. It is argued that the leaders excluding their
identities from debate increased the flow of discussion among the common people and
"theoretically created an equal opportunity, a greater chance for equal access to the
marketplace, and a more expansive sphere for participation." Id. at 51.
25. See generally Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001).
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In the 1960 Supreme Court case Talley v. California, the Court
addressed whether a Los Angeles city ordinance prohibiting the distribution
of handbills that did not have the name and address of its author or distributor
2 6 In
displayed on the cover was an abridgement of the freedom of speech.
holding the ordinance void on its face, the Talley Court stated, "There can
be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict
27 It
freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.,
went on to reference other case law that established "times and
circumstances when States may not compel members of groups engaged in
the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified," such as when
"identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions
of public matters of importance."2"
More recently, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,the Supreme
Court addressed whether an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of
29
anonymous campaign literature violated the First Amendment. In finding
that the statute was inconsistent with the First Amendment, the McIntyre
Court stated that anonymous speech is "an honorable tradition of advocacy
and of dissent."30 It continued to state, "Anonymity is a shield from the
tyranny of the majority... [and] exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of
Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular
individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand
of an intolerant society."'" The Court made clear that it realized the "right
to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct,"
but it went on to say that "in general, our society accords greater weight to
the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse."32 Thus, the
McIntyre Court made clear the importance of continuing the tradition of
anonymous speech, while at the same time acknowledging that there are
33
countervailing interests in protecting against defamatory speech.
The McIntyre Court is not the only court that has acknowledged
countervailing interests and their effect on the level of protection the speech
is afforded. In fact, the level of protection afforded to speech has often been
26. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 60-61 (1960).
27. Id. at 64.
28. Id. at 65 (citing Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v.
Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
29. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 334 (1995).
30. Id. at 357.
31. Id.
32. Id. Note the Court's acknowledgement of society's general tendency to afford the
value of free speech greater weight than its potential misuse was in the context of political
speech. Id.
33. Id. at 349-50.
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decided based on the type of speech at issue.34 In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, the Supreme Court ruled that with regard to defamation, political
speech would be afforded higher protection than other types of speech.35 A
public figure that wishes to recover damages from defamation related to his
official conduct is required to prove the statement at issue was made with
actual malice.36 The Court reasoned that the freedom of speech "was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."37 Therefore, protection
of political speech was necessary to maintain the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."3 8 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged a difference in the
level of protection afforded to commercial speech, ruling that it has lower
protection than political speech but may have more protection in some
instances over speech that is neither commercial nor political.39 Thus, the
Supreme Court has made clear that First Amendment protection of speech
turns on the type of speech in question.
H1. DEFAMATION ACTIONS INVOLVING ANONYMOUS DEFENDANTS

In 1997, the Supreme Court offered insight into the power of the
Internet and extended First Amendment protection to online speech.4 ° In the
2001 case, Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington echoed the Supreme Court's holding that
First Amendment rights applied to online speech and emphasized that it must

34. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
38. Id. at 270.
39. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
40. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) ("[T]he Internet can hardly be considered
a 'scarce' expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
communication of all kinds .... This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication
includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and still images,
as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a
phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same
individual can become a pamphleteer .... [O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level
of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.").
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be carefully safeguarded. 41 This Part will begin by analyzing how courts
have developed the law protecting against defamation in conjunction with
First Amendment anonymity and conclude by analyzing the most prevalent
standards used in the United States, as well as the justifications given for
applying them.42
A.

The Development of DefamationLaw, FirstAmendment Anonymity,
and the Internet

In Doe v. Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the First
Amendment protection of anonymous online speech in the context of
defamation.43 Acknowledging that First Amendment protection does not
extend to defamation or libelous speech, Cahill quoted the United States
Supreme Court and stated, "It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
44
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Accordingly, the Cahillcourt stated that courts "must adopt a standard that
anonymously against
appropriately balances one person's right to speak
45
another person's right to protect his reputation.,

41. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("The
Internet is a truly democratic forum for communication. It allows for the free exchange of
ideas at an unprecedented speed and scale. For this reason, the constitutional rights of Internet
users, including the First Amendment right to speak anonymously, must be carefully
safeguarded.").
42. Although different standards have been applied for revealing the identity of an
anonymous defendant, the reasons for the lack of consistency in standard have never been
explicitly due to the distinction between political or non-political. See Martin, supra note 15
at 1237 ("[C]ourts have developed standards for unmasking anonymous internet speakers
without regard for the content of the speech at issue. In fact, no court has even hinted at
developing different standards for cases involving political speech and cases involving nonpolitical speech."). However, this Comment proposes that the distinction between types of
speech has implicitly, perhaps even unintentionally had a profound impact on the court's
decision to apply a standard. See infra, Part Il.
43. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455-56 (Del. 2005) ("The internet is a unique
democratizing medium unlike anything that has come before. The advent of the internet
dramatically changed the nature of public discourse by allowing more and diverse people to
engage in public debate .... Through the internet, speakers can bypass mainstream media to
speak directly to 'an audience larger and more diverse than any the Framers could have
It is clear that speech over the internet is entitled to First Amendment
imagined ....
protection extends to anonymous internet speech.").
This
protection.
44. Id. at 456 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
45. id. The issue is determining how to adequately balance those interests in a manner
that adequately correlates with the speech at hand.
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When anonymous online defamation suits were first becoming
common, plaintiffs would acquire the information needed to identify the
defendant from Internet Service Providers by having their attorneys issue a
subpoena.46 This method was pro-plaintiff and denied the defendant an
opportunity to object to the subpoena or seekjudicial intervention. However,
many jurisdictions found these attorney-issued-subpoenas invalid and
instead, only allowed a plaintiff to seek out the defendant's identity by court
order.47 This shift led to the development of the "show cause" requirement
where a plaintiff must provide justification for identifying the anonymous
defendant.4 8 It is during the "show cause" determination that judges balance
plaintiffs' and defendants' competing interests.4 9
B.

Capstone Standardsfor UncoveringAnonymous Defendants in
Defamation Suits

The standards applied for revealing anonymous defendants range from
pro-plaintiff to ones that make revealing a defendant's identity nearly
impossible.5 ° This section will address the three capstone standards5 1 : (1)

46. Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking "JohnDoe" Defendants: The Case Against Excessive
Hand-WringingOver Legal Standards,83 OR. L. REv. 795, 802-03 (2004).
47. Id.
48. Id.at 846.
49. Martin, supra note 15, at 1227. At the beginning of the balancing process, a hearing
is held to determine whether or not the defendant's identity should be revealed, courts
commonly apply different standards for this determination. Id. at 1227.
50. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 ("Before this Court is an entire spectrum of 'standards' that
could be required, ranging (in ascending order) from a good faith basis to assert a claim, to
pleading sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, to a showing ofprimafacie evidence
sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment, and beyond that, hurdles even more
stringent."). Most cases have applied standards favoring the defendant's right to anonymous
online speech. See Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (D.D.C. 2009); Doe
Iv. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254-56 (D. Conn. 2008); McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp.
2d 259, 268 (D. Mass. 2006); Highfields Capital Mgmt. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975-76
(N.D. Cal. 2005); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); A.Z.
v. Doe, No. A-5060-08T3, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 472, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Mar. 8, 2010). However, a few cases have applied more plaintiff friendly standards.
See, e.g., Columbia Ins. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 576 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
51. The three standards that will be laid below have been consistently held as the capstone
or pinnacle standards for revealing anonymous defendants and most courts that depart from
using one of the three often apply some variation or combination of these standards. See
Martin, supra note 15, at 1228-37; see also Thomson v. Doe, 356 P.3d 727, 731 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2015) ("We now turn to the requisite showing a defamation plaintiff must make on a
motion to unmask an anonymous defendant .... The two leading cases are
Dendrite... [and] Cahill ....");
Id. at 733 ("[O]ne court has significantly strayed from
Dendrite and Cahill. The Virginia Court of Appeals declined to adopt either test, instead
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the Dendrite "Prima Facie" Standard;5 2 (2) the Cahill "Summary54Judgment"
Standard.
Standard; 53 and (3) the America Online "Good Faith"

1.

The Dendrite "PrimaFacie" Standard

One of the capstone standards for revealing anonymous defendants is
known as the Dendrite "Prima Facie" Standard, established in the New
Jersey case Dendrite InternationalInc. v. Doe No. 3.55 In Dendrite, the
plaintiff requested that the trial court grant it permission to conduct limited
discovery for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of defendant, John Doe
No. 3, from Yahoo. 5 6 The plaintiff alleged various claims against the
defendant for breach of contract, defamation, and other actionable statements
on the Yahoo bulletin board.5 7 The trial court denied the plaintiff's request,
and plaintiff subsequently appealed. 58 The Superior Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the company's request and went a
59
step further, offering guidelines to the trial courts. It set out a four-part test
for plaintiffs to satisfy in order to be granted permission to seek out a
defendant's identity.60
First, a plaintiff must make efforts to notify an anonymous defendant
that they are "the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of
disclosure, and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named defendants a
reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application."61
Second, a plaintiff must present "the exact statements purportedly made by
62
each anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech."
applying a state statute that required.., a defamation plaintiff seeking an anonymous
speaker's identity [to] establish a good faith basis to contend that the speaker committed
defamation."); Mallory Allen, Ninth Circuit Unmasks Anonymous Internet Users and Lowers
the Barfor Disclosure of Online Speakers, 7 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 75, 81-85 (2011).
52. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 756-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
53. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457.
54. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 2000), rev 'd on other grounds,Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542
S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
55. Dendrite Int'l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 756.
56. Id. at 760.
57. Id. at 760 n.1.
58. Id.at 760.
59. Id. The guideline offered to the trial courts were to be used "when faced with an
application by a plaintiff for expedited discovery seeking an order compelling an ISP to honor
a subpoena and disclose the identity of anonymous Internet posters." Id.
60. Id. at 760--61.
61. Id. at 760.
62. Id.
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Third, the court must carefully review all information submitted by a plaintiff
to determine whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to
support each element of its cause of action against the defendant, or in other
words, set forth a prima facie cause of action that could survive a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. 63 Fourth and finally, assuming the court
finds that a "plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause of action, the court
must balance the defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free
speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the
necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity to allow
the plaintiff to properly proceed. 64
The Dendrite court failed to expound upon this final balancing of
interests although it appears to be similar to the balancing of interests it
mentioned before laying out the rule. 65 Before laying out its new standard,
the Dendrite court stated:
The trial court must consider and decide those applications by striking a
balance between the well-established First Amendment right to speak
anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary interests
and reputation through the assertion of recognizable claims based on the
66
actionable conduct of the anonymous, fictitiously-named defendants.
Thus, the Dendritecourt expressed the need to balance interests but did
not establish on what basis the trial court should do SO. 6 7 In fact, upon
mentioning this needed balance and that the "guiding principle is a result
based on a meaningful analysis and a proper balancing of the equities and
rights at issue," the court immediately referred to the underlying facts of the
case.

68

Although it was not explicitly stated, the court suggested that the
standard chosen was due in large part to commercial speech. 69 The plaintiff,
Dendrite International, was a publicly traded company with ties to multiple
countries.7" The anonymous defendant's alleged defamation arose from
several posts criticizing the company's change in revenue recognition,
admonishing the company president's tactics, and suggesting the company's
competitive edge in the market was slipping, causing the president to secretly

63. Id.
64. Id. at 760-61.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 760.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 761.
69. See id. at 761 (describing the Web as a "sprawling mall offering goods and services").
70. Id.Dendrite is a publicly traded company incorporated in New Jersey with offices
in 21 countries. Id.
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but unsuccessfully look for suitors willing to buy the company.7 Although
the Dendrite court designed its prima facie standard within the context of
commercial speech,7 2 this standard has not exclusively been applied to
commercial speech.
2.

The Cahill "Summary Judgment" Standard

Since the Dendrite standard was first applied it has been used in
multiple cases across the nation.7 3 However, four years later, in Doe v.
Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed what it considered the
Dendrite "Prima Facie" standard and applied a revised version that has
become as commonly used the Dendrite standard.74 The standard set out in
Cahill, commonly called the "Summary Judgment" standard, is perhaps the
most burdensome standard for a plaintiff to meet. 5
In Cahill, the John Doe defendant, operating under the pseudonym
"Proud Citizen," posted two statements on an online blog sponsored by the
Delaware State News.76 The posts concerned Cahill's performance as a City
Councilman of Smyrna, Delaware.77 Doe accused Cahill of being a "prime
example of failed leadership" and a "divisive impediment to any kind of
cooperative movement., 78 Additionally, the post suggested that anyone who
spends time with Cahill would be "keenly aware" of his "obvious mental
deterioration. 7 9 Cahill obtained a court order requiring the Internet Service
Provider, Comcast, to reveal the identity of Doe.8 ° Comcast notified Doe of
the court order, and Doe moved for an emergency protective order to prevent

71. Id. at 762-63.

72. The Dendrite Standard has also been used to prevent a plaintiff from moving forward
in cases that involve non-political, non-commercial private speech. See Doe I v. Individuals,
561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254-57 (D. Conn. 2008).

73. See, e.g., id.; In re Ind. Newspapers Inc., 963 N.E.2d 534, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012);
Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184, 193 (N.H.
2010).
74. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005). Note that although the summary
judgment standard in this case was applied to speech likely to be considered political, the
Cahill court made no distinction based on whether the anonymous defendant's speech was
political or non-political and the summary judgment standard has since been applied in both
contexts. See id.
75. See id.

76. Id. at 454.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id. at 455.
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Cahill from obtaining his identity."' The trial court applied the "Good Faith"
82
standard and denied Doe's motion.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the trial court's
decision to apply the "Good Faith" standard, finding it too easy for the
plaintiff to satisfy. 83 Instead, the court took the opportunity to create and
apply a new standard. The court held that "before a defamation plaintiff can
obtain the identity of an anonymous defendant through the compulsory
discovery process he must support his defamation claim with facts sufficient
to defeat a summary judgment motion." 84 Accordingly, it adopted "a
modified Dendrite standard consisting only of Dendrite requirements one
and three: the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to notify the defendant
and must satisfy the summary judgment standard. 8 5
Although the court purported to adopt a modified Dendrite standard, it
barely resembles Dendrite's requirements. The court completely did away
with the second and fourth requirements, 86 and curiously adopted the third
requirement of the Dendrite standard as if it required a plaintiff to provide
sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment.8 7 The actual
third prong of the Dendrite standard merely required a plaintiff to provide
sufficient evidence to defeat a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary
judgment.88
When a defendant moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff may survive the motion as long as a plaintiff s
complaint provides well-pleaded factual allegations that are enough to raise
81. Id.
82. Id. This serves as a good example of the indecisive nature of the Court's decision to
apply any given standard. There are multiple cases in which the trial court applies one
standard and the appellate court applies another. See, e.g., In re Anonymous Online Speakers,
661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
83. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460.
84. Id. It went on to compare its standard to the Dendrite standard, and although it
declined to adopt the standard, it retained portions of the Dendrite standard it felt were
necessary to properly balance the interests of a plaintiff and defendant. Id. at 460-61.
85. Id.
86. Id.at 460-61. Regarding the second Dendrite requirement, the Cahill court stated
that the requirement would be "subsumed into the summary judgment inquiry" because in
order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff will have to quote the
defamatory statements set forth in his or her complaint. Id.at 460. As to the fourth Dendrite
requirement, the trial court balance the defendant's First Amendment rights against the
strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the Cahill court found it unnecessary because the
"summary judgment test is itself the balance" [and it] adds no protection above and beyond
that of the summary judgment test and needlessly complicates the analysis." Id.
87. Id.
88. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 756-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
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a right to relief above the speculative level. 8 9 In assessing a plaintiff's
complaint, a court must ask whether it is plausible for the law to allow
recovery on the basis of the factual allegations, assuming that all the
allegations in the complaint are true.9 ° On the other hand, in order for a
plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must show
that there is a genuine issue of material fact, or, in other words, show that the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff
based on specific facts set forth by the parties without any assumption of
their truth.9 1
It is clear from comparing what is required in a motion for summary
judgment versus a motion to dismiss that the summary judgment standard
Cahill established is a far more stringent standard than the Dendrite
standard. 9 Thus, it appears the Cahill court was misguided in expressing
the adoption of the third prong of Dendrite.93 In reality, the court only
adopted the first prong notification requirement, which created a new, more
stringent standard a plaintiff must meet in order to obtain the identity of the
anonymous defendant.
Before laying out this more stringent standard, the court addressed its
justification by highlighting the interests at hand.9 4 The court first started its
justification by addressing the concern that a standard too low will create a
chilling effect on potential posters exercising their right to speak
anonymously out of fear of a future lawsuit.9 5 It then compared this concern
with the need for a defamation plaintiff to obtain a "very important form of
relief by unmasking the identity of his anonymous critics."96 The court
reasoned that revealing the identity of an anonymous speaker risks leaving
that person vulnerable to ostracism, retaliation from a plaintiff, or unwanted
exposure. 97

89. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
90. See id.
91. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986).
92. Compare discussion supra Section II.B.1 (the Dendrite standard), with discussion
supra II.B.2 (the Cahill standard).
93. See DendriteInt'l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 756-61. The actual third prong of the Dendrite
standard merely required a plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence to defeat a motion to
dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. Id.
94. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005).
95. Id. at 457 ("The possibility of losing anonymity in a future lawsuit could intimidate
anonymous posters into self-censoring their comments or simply not commenting at all.").
96. Id. The court singles out public figures specifically when it references defamation
plaintiffs. Id.
97. Id.
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The fear the court expressed derived from a surge in plaintiffs seeking
to reveal the identity of the defendants under an easily met standard, only to
use the new found knowledge of the defendant's identity to engage in "extrajudicial self-help remedies." 98 The court stated, "This 'sue first, ask
questions later' approach, coupled with a standard only minimally protective
of the anonymity of defendants, will discourage debate on important issues
of public concern as more and more anonymous posters censor their online
statements in response to the likelihood of being unmasked."99
Thus, the Cahill court revealed that its real concern was the potential
chilling on public debate regarding important issues.100 This is not always a
concern in defamation cases that involve one private individual defaming the
personal life of another private individual. However, this concern does make
sense in the context of public figures and political speech, which was the
type of speech at issue in Cahill.101 The court did not specify whether the
standard it created in Cahill should be applied broadly across the spectrum
of speech types at issue in any given defamation claim, or if it should apply
only to political speech. Nonetheless, it is clear the standard is aimed at
political speech at the expense of a public figure. 0 2
3.

The America Online "GoodFaith" Standard

The third standard, and most plaintiff frfiendly compared to Dendrite
and Cahill,is the "Good Faith" standard established in In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to America Online, Inc. 0' 3 In America Online, the plaintiff company
subpoenaed America Online (AOL) to reveal four anonymous defendants
who were subscribers. 0 4 The plaintiff asserted that defendants used online
chat rooms to publish defamatory material, misrepresentations, and
confidential insider information concerning the plaintiff company "in breach

98. Id. These anomalistic lawsuits came to be known as "Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation" or SLAPP suits, and many states adopted Anti-SLAPP laws to prevent
this abuse of the system. Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online
Anonymity and the FirstAmendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405, 416 (2003).
99. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457.
100. Id. ("We are concerned that setting the standard too low will chill potential posters
from exercising their First Amendment right to speak anonymously.").
101. Id.("The parties inform us that we are the first State Supreme Court to address this
issue, particularly in the context of a case involving political criticism of a public figure.").
102. See id.
103. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online Speakers., 52 Va.Cir. 26, 26 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 2000), rev 'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542
S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
104. Id.at 26.
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of the fiduciary duties and contractual obligations owed."' 5 In response,
AOL moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the subpoena "unreasonably
impairs the First Amendment rights of the John Does to speak anonymously
on the Internet."' °6 After assessing the subpoena's burden on the defendants'
First Amendment rights, the court established a new standard for revealing
the identity of defendants, ruling that
a court should only order a non-party, Internet service provider to provide
information concerning the identity of a subscriber (1) when the court is
satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to that court (2) that the party
requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it
may be the victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit was
identity information is centrally needed to
filed and (3) the subpoenaed
107
advance that claim.
In justifying this amiable standard, the American Online court pointed
to the potential dangers of the unlimited communicative power of the
It stated, "The protection of the right to communicate
Internet.'0 8
anonymously must be balanced against the need to assure that those persons
who choose to abuse the opportunities presented by this medium can be made
to answer for such transgressions."' 9 Finally, the court held that "[t]hose
who suffer damages as a result of tortious or other actionable
communications on the Internet should be able to seek appropriate redress
by preventing the wrongdoers from hiding behind an illusory shield of
purported First Amendment rights.""' America Online and Dendrite both
deal with what would be considered commercial speech and they apply
significantly different standards, yet their justification for applying different
standards is essentially the same."'
In expounding upon the capstone standards and the cases that created
them, it is clear that there is no congruency in the way courts have applied
the various standards. Each court stated it must balance the interests in
105. Id. at 26-27.
106. Id. at28.
107. Id. at 37.
108. Id. at 34 ("[T]he Internet provides a virtually unlimited, inexpensive, and almost
immediate means of communication with tens, if not hundreds, of millions of people, the
dangers of its misuse cannot be ignored.").
109. Id. at 34-35 (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
First Amendment jurisprudence has always "embodie[d] an
U.S. 727, 741 (1996).
overarching commitment to protect speech... but, without imposing judicial formulas so
rigid that they become a straightjacket that disables government from responding to serious
problems." Denver Area Educ., 518 U.S. at 741.
110. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum toAm. Online Speakers, 52 Va. Cir. at 35.
111. Compare supra note 67 and accompanying text, with supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
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protecting First Amendment anonymity against the need to provide a
plaintiff with a remedy, but the courts applied different standards to similar
facts and the same standards to very different facts. The only justification
for applying one standard over another is the particular court's view of the
facts. However, in some cases such as in Dendrite and Cahill, it appears the
applied standard is chosen more so due to the type of speech at issue, and not
11 2
the facts.
In light of this understanding, the better solution is abandoning
adherence to the ambiguous balancing system these courts have attempted to
apply and creating a streamlined approach under which every court can apply
the standard that correlates with the type of speech at issue. This approach
appreciates the courts' interest in protecting First Amendment anonymous
speech, but it also acknowledges the interest of a plaintiff, not only in seeking
redress, but also in the time, money, and expertise that must be applied in
bringing suit against an anonymous defendant. It is unreasonable to expect
a plaintiff to bring a claim before the court without knowing what amount of
evidence will suffice to reveal the defendant and obtain more useful
discovery." 3 Furthermore, it is unreasonable to subject a plaintiff to a
heightened standard when its claim involves neither political nor commercial
14
speech. 1
C. In re Anonymous Online Speakers: The Voice of Reason
In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
illustrated the inconsistency in choosing a given standard and offered a
solution.115 In In re Anonymous Online Speakers, the issue presented was
whether the identities of five anonymous speakers should be revealed to the
plaintiff.1 16 The plaintiff, Quixtar, Inc., alleged that a competing company,
Signature Management TEAM, defamed it by creating an online smear
campaign. 117 The defamation was carried out by the five anonymous authors
from five different online sources, and Quixtar believed the five authors were
employees of TEAM.1 1 Similar to other courts facing this issue, the Ninth
Circuit began its opinion by pointing to the justification for protecting

112. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3,
775 A.2d 756, 756-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
113. See infra Part IlI.
114. See infra Part III.
115. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011).
116. Id.at 1172.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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anonymous speech.1 19 It stated, "[T]he ability to speak anonymously on the
Internet promotes the robust exchange of ideas and allows individuals to
or official
express themselves freely without 'fear of economic
121
ostracism.',
social
about
concern
[or]
retaliation...
The court then addressed the value of speech as the determining factor
for the degree of scrutiny that is generally applied to the freedom of
speech.12 1 It presented examples of the level of scrutiny applied to the three
common forms of speech: political speech, commercial speech, and
unprotected speech. 12 2 Each category of speech is afforded a different level
of protection, and, although the Anonymous Online court did not explicitly
say it, the level of protection is in direct correlation with each particular form
of the speech's social value. 123 The court went on to present an overview of
the various standards that have been applied, including the "Prima Facie"
standard from Dendrite and the "Good Faith" standard from America
Online.124 It then considered the lower court's decision to apply the
"Summary Judgment" standard from Cahill.125 While understanding the
application of Cahill, the court stated the lower court "appropriately
considered the important value of anonymous speech balanced against a
party's need for relevant discovery in a civil action."' 2 6 Thus, operating
under the premise that the lower court "has wide latitude in controlling

119. Id. at 1172-73.
120. Id. at 1173 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42
(1995)).
121. Id. ("The right to speak, whether anonymously or otherwise, is not unlimited,
however, and the degree of scrutiny varies depending on the circumstances and the type of
speech at issue.").
122. Id. Such as fighting words or obscenity. Id.
123. Id. The court references political speech's importance in the history of the country
as justification for it having the highest level of protection. Id.(citing Meyer v. Grant 486
U.S. 414, 425 (1988)). It then addresses commercial speech's limited measure of protection
based on its lower value than political speech, but then implies that the protection is lowered
when the speech is misleading or unlawful, or in other words of lesser social value. Id. (citing
Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989); Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)). It concludes its
examples by expressing that speech like fighting words and obscenity are afforded no
protection at all, therefore implying that in certain circumstances, speech is given no
protection because it has no social value. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942)).
124. Id. at 1175-76.
125. Id. at 1176.
126. Id.
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discovery," the Ninth Circuit refused to overturn the lower court's decision
to apply Cahill unless there was clear error; it ruled there was not. 127
Despite finding that the lower court did not err in applying the Cahill
"Summary Judgment" standard, the court stated that "[i]n the context of the
speech at issue ...Cahill's bar extends too far" and then suggested "the
nature of the speech should be a driving force in choosing a standard by
which to balance the rights of anonymous speakers in discovery disputes."' 2 8
The court explained by stating, "The specific circumstances surrounding the
speech serve to give context to the balancing exercise."' 2 9 Although the
Anonymous Online court's suggestion explicitly mentions that the "nature of
the speech" should be a driving force in choosing which standard to apply,
it implied that this "nature" directly correlates with the type of speech at
issue.13 Thus, Anonymous Online implicitly suggested that the type of
speech at issue should be the determinative factor in choosing which
standard to apply. In contrast, Part III addresses the determinative factor that
currently predominates court decisions: the social value of speech.
III. SOCIAL VALUE: AN OUTDATED DECIDING FACTOR

As previously stated, the Supreme Court has made clear that First
Amendment protection of speech turns on the type of speech at issue.'
Although courts continue to protect anonymous speech based on the type of
speech, courts have turned from type-based consideration and opted to afford
protection for speech based on the "value" of its content.132 Arguably, typebased considerations and value-based considerations are one in the same;
after all, the decisions to afford one type of speech more protection than
another ultimately turned on how socially valuable it was.' 33 However, as
127. Id. at 1176-77 (quoting White v. City of San Diego, 605 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir.

1979)).
128. Id. at 1177 (citing Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194-96 (2010); Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2010)).
129. Id.
130. After mentioning the nature of speech as a driving force, the court went on to give
the example that "in discovery disputes involving the identity of anonymous speakers, the
notion that commercial speech should be afforded less protection than political, religious, or
literary speech is hardly a novel principle." In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at
1177.
131. See infra Part I.
132. George H. Carr, Note, Application of U.S. Supreme Court Doctrine to Anonymity in
the Networld, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 521, 536 (1996) ("American free-speech jurisprudence
has long recognized that speech is protected according to the valuation of its content by the
government.").
133. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
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society has entered into a more advanced technological age and
communication across the Internet has grown, courts have struggled with
applying value-based First Amendment principles in a consistent manner.
In applying the First Amendment to online defamation, some courts, as
seen in America Online, have voiced concerns for the potential dangers of
the Internet.134 Their apprehension is based on the Internet's ability to
disseminate wrongful or defamatory information broadly and at an
unmatched rate of speed. 135 This problem has only intensified with the
advent of social media, especially for young adults and teenagers who devote
a great deal of their social interactions to online communication.13 6 In an
instant, a person can be the victim of pernicious defamation made publicly
available to everyone they interact with online and in real life.
The argument against such dangers is the idea that online
communication is often filled with "hyperbole, invective, short-hand phrases
and language not generally found in fact-based documents" or
"exaggeration, figurative speech and broad generalities." 137 Such speech is
commonly viewed by society as lacking credibility, so the potential for
38
online speech to result in actual harm to a plaintiff is not cause for concern. 1
However, even this view of online communication may be disputed by those
who believe that society has gradually transitioned to the Internet for the bulk
of its information over time, and that social media platforms have become
the hubs for interpersonal communication.
Although society may still look to trusted sources for its news, it is at
least arguable that information may be perceived with the same amount of
credibility when it comes from an individual's social media page rather than

134. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va.Cir. 26 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 2000), rev 'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542
S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
135. See id
136. See Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEw REs. CTR.
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://permacc/R8A2-8X9F. According to Pew Research Center surveys of
social media use, "some 88% of 18- to 29-year-olds indicate that they use any form of social
media. That share falls to 78% among those ages 30 to 49, to 64% among those ages 50 to
64 and to 37% among Americans 65 and older." Id.Among U.S. adults who say they use
Twitter, 26% use the site several times daily, while an additional 20% admit to using it about
once daily. Id. The percentages increase substantially for Instagram, Snapchat, and
Facebook. Id.
137. See Glob. Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267-68 (C.D. Cal.
2001) ("[T]hese postings.., lack the formality and polish typically found in documents in
which a reader would expect to find facts.").
138. See id. at 1268.
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a longstanding news outlet. 139 These countervailing arguments are capable
of swaying courts to assess the value of speech in different ways. In short,
the value of anonymous online speech is subject to great flux which results
in inconsistent determinations by courts because they have no choice but to
rely on their own assessment of the speech and its effect on its audience's
perception of fact.
This subjective value determination plays a decisive role in whether the
identity of an anonymous defendant is revealed or protected. 140 The more
socially useful the content of the speech is, the more likely a court will seek
to protect the anonymity of its author under the First Amendment.
Additionally, the less impactful the speech is on the audience's perception
of fact, the more likely a court will find no reason to reveal the identity of
the anonymous author.14 1 In contrast, when the content of the speech has
little to no social usefulness or when the effect on the reader's perception of
fact is greater, it is more likely that a court will allow a plaintiff to obtain the
142
anonymous author's identity.
Although the court may intend to make these determinations
objectively, the evolving nature of online communication, combined with
debatable reliability, unavoidably causes the determination of value to be
more subjective than intended. As a result, parties to a defamation action
could be subjected to any one of the applicable standards for revealing the
identity of a defendant. This could leave plaintiffs who have suffered
reputational harm on a smaller scale subjected to a standard that is very
burdensome to meet only because the anonymous defendant had a small
audience or is often sarcastic in his posts. On the other hand, anonymous
139. "In a recent survey, 35 percent of respondents ages 18-29 listed social media as their
most helpful source of information. For ages 30-49, social media came in third, behind news
and cable TV websites." Lisa Goldsberry, Is social media more influential than the news
media?, AXIA PuB. REL. (Dec. 28,2016) https://perma.cc/EB8F-X8JW. "Research shows that
people don't often differentiate between news that comes from a traditional outlet, such as
CNN, and information that comes from questionable sources (e.g., passed on by the cousin of
a friend). This makes it easier for false information to spread quickly." Id. "Younger [people]
are often more concerned about their social networks. In fact, studies show that people ages
18-49 trust news and information shared by their friends more than from any other source."
Id.
140. See supra Part II. Although the cases cited in Part II applied one of the three
categorical standards to determine whether the defendant's identity should be revealed, each
court still considered the value of the speech at issue in choosing a standard to apply.
141. See Glob. Telemedia Int'l, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1267-71 (finding that because of the
context of the posts, it is more likely to be viewed as an opinion and not a credible source of
fact, and therefore the plaintiff has no actionable claim).
142. Nicosia v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Underwager
v. Channel 9 Austl., 69 F.3d 361, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1995); Info. Control Corp. v. Genesis One
Comput. Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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defendants who voice their grievances about a company may be subject to a
very low standard for revealing their identity because the court finds their
speech has a detrimental effect on a plaintiff. Some scholars argue that the
McIntyre decision wished to do away with this possibility by making value
determinations irrelevant to the level of protection afforded to speech and to
143
the standard applied in revealing an anonymous speaker's identity.
However, in the online speech cases following McIntyre, the value
determination did not stay irrelevant, but instead became a component of
balancing the interests of a plaintiff with the interests in the right to
anonymous speech. 144
In summary, the choice of which standard to apply when a plaintiff
requests the identity of an anonymous defendant hinges on the value
determination. The value determination allows a plaintiff to be subjected to
any standard based on the given court's wavering view of various
145 This method
extenuating circumstances surrounding the speech at issue.
complicates revealing a defendant's identity and creates confusion as to what
standard will apply to speech in each situation. Plaintiffs seeking redress
cannot accurately gauge the standard they will have to meet in court, so they
are discouraged from filing potentially legitimate claims.
IV. MOVING FORWARD FROM ANONYMOUS ONLINE: THE "TYPE METHOD"
The approach suggested by Anonymous Online implicitly considers the
146
type of speech at issue as a basis for revealing the defendant's identity.
The type of speech at issue has been a determining factor for the amount of
protection afforded to anonymous speech, thus it seems natural for it to also
be a determining factor for the appropriate standard of revealing the
defendant's identity to a plaintiff. 147 If determining the standard was based
on the type of speech, the unpredictability that arises from a wide open value
determination would be substantially reduced, if not cease to exist. The
decisions that established the different levels of protection for the different
148
types of speech was done based on the value determination, so it is largely
unnecessary to reopen Pandora's box. Therefore, this Comment proposes
that the standards applied in America Online, Dendrite, and Cahill be
143. See Carr,supra note 133, at 536-37.
144. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011).
145. See supra Part II.
146. See supra Part II.C.
147. See supra notes 17-22.
148. See supra Part II. Although the cases cited in Part 1I applied one of the three
categorical standards to determine whether the defendant's identity should be revealed, each
court still considered the value of the speech at issue in choosing a standard to apply.
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dissolved as individual standards, and instead be fused together as multiple
extensions of one universally applied type-based approach that this
Comment will refer to as the "Type Method."
A.

Implementing the "Type Method"

Under the "Type Method," courts will begin with notifying anonymous
speakers that they are subject to subpoena. This was the case in the original
Dendrite and Cahill standards. 149 Once the anonymous defendants have
been properly notified, the courts will assess the type of anonymous online
speech at issue based on: (1) the content of the speech and (2) who or what
the speech allegedly defames. The results of this assessment determine
which branch of the "Type Method" the speech will fall under. As stated
above, the branches will take the form of the three capstone standards from
Cahill, Dendrite,and America Online. However, instead of allowing courts
to decide the applicable standard based on a general balancing "between a
defamation plaintiffs right to protect his reputation and a defendant's right
to exercise free speech anonymously," courts will simply apply the
appropriate standard to the correlating type of speech. 150
If the speech addresses a public official or entity and the content of the
message pertains to an issue that would be relevant to the public, then this
should be sufficient to be considered political speech. 15' Thus, the
anonymous speaker's identity should be protected under the most stringent
Cahill standard. If the speech addresses a company, a corporate entity, or
one of its agents, and the content of the message pertains to an issue
involving the business decisions, financial transactions, or the public
relations of that company, then the speaker's identity should be protected
under the intermediate Dendrite standard. Finally, if the speech is addressed
to a private individual or group, and the content of its message relates to
issues that are not relevant to the public, then the speaker should be protected
under the plaintiff-friendly America Online standard. Under the "Type
Method," plaintiffs will be able to better prepare their claims with
predictability, which will save them time, money, and effort. The "Type
Method" will also continue to afford the necessary and appropriate amount
of protection to the defendants' First Amendment rights.

149. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460--61 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3,
775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).

150. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460.
151. See generally Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Curtis Publ'g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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B. Justifying the "Type Method" and Which StandardApplies to Which
Speech Type
The idea behind the "Type Method" is to streamline the process of
choosing the applicable standard, create a more efficient and consistent
judicial system, and adequately protect the constitutional right to anonymous
speech. However, the most important issue the "Type Method" addresses is
the common trend of applying a standard too high or too low for the speech
at issue, which either results in an inappropriately high burden on a plaintiff's
claim or a disregard for the rights of a defendant.
The Dendrite and Cahill decisions both arose out of a lower court's
decision to apply a standard too low for revealing the defendant's identity
based on the speech at issue. 15 2 The Anonymous Online decision arose from
' The mistakes made
a lower court's decision to apply a standard too high. 53
in these lower court cases are a result of an improper balancing of interests.
Thus, the "Type Method" seeks to eliminate the possibility of mistakes by
removing the balancing mechanism that creates the issues. Each of the types
of speech have already been weighed upon by the courts and the amount of
protection they each deserve has already been decided. 15 4 Thus far, these
established levels of protection based on the type of speech have, more often
than not, produced just outcomes.
As explained in Part I, political speech has been set apart from all other
forms of speech as having the strongest impact on society, having the
greatest presence in the history and tradition of our nation, and being the
most necessary to drive society forward and give a voice to every person. 55
These are important considerations that have caused the Supreme Court and
various other courts to afford political speech the highest degree of
protection. It is only fitting that speech that would be classified as political
speech in anonymous defamation cases be afforded a highly protective
standard for revealing anonymous defendants as well. Although the Cahill
court was not explicit, its opinion implied that the political nature of the
speech at issue was a driving force in creating the overly burdensome
"Summary Judgment" standard.1 56 The plaintiff will be considerably
burdened in such cases, but it is necessary to prevent a chilling effect on
political speech due to the reasons mentioned above. 157
152. See supra Part II.B.
153. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011).
154. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566-71 (1980).
155. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270-71.
156. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
157. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
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Commercial speech on the other hand is not quite as impactful and
important to our society as political speech, so it is afforded less
protection.15 8 However, courts have recognized that commercial speech is
important to society with respect to the desire that businesses operate in an
open and honest way. Therefore, speech pertaining to the business of
companies, organizations, or corporations should be afforded greater
protection in some instances. 15 9
Any time finances are at play, the need for unencumbered
communication elevates; more is at stake because society must be able to put
its trust in the products or services it spends its money on. The more
protection afforded to commercial speech, the more control society has over
commercial business.16 ° It allows the individual the power to keep an honest
business honest. Because commercial speech may need more protection than
regular speech, but it is not as socially valuable as political speech, it may be
afforded an intermediate degree of protection. It follows suit that if
commercial speech is afforded an intermediate form of protection in a
general sense, then the intermediate "Prima Facie" standard for revealing
anonymous defendants would appropriately apply. In Dendrite, the speech
at issue was commercial, and the court's consideration of the type of speech
weighed heavily upon its decision to apply a higher standard than the "Good
Faith" standard applied by the lower court. 61 The Dendrite "Prima Facie"
standard adequately protects the defendant, but it doesn't overly burden a
plaintiff that may suffer considerable loss due to the defendant's speech.
Finally, there are defamation cases dealing with speech that is neither
political nor commercial. 16 2 These cases involve one private individual
posting online about another private individual, which is most often the case
on social media. Consider the classic hypothetical case of two high school
classmates who do not get along. After a feud or fallout, one decides to deal
with his or her frustrations by posting malicious lies about the other under a
pseudonym on Twitter or an anonymous social media site such as the late
Yik Yak. 163 These types of posts or statements have little to no social value
158. See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
159. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 764-65.

160. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 561-62 (1980).
161. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 765-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001); Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254-56 (D. Conn. 2008).

162. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
163. Yik Yak was an anonymous social media app that allowed users without assigned
usemarnmes or handles to post to an open forum based on proximity. Nick Statt, Yik Yak, once
valued at $400 million, shuts down and sells off engineersfor $1 million, THE VERGE (Apr.
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and generally only lead to the pain and suffering of the victim.164 Although
the defendant in such a case still has First Amendment rights to speak freely,
a plaintiff may become ostracized at school and be ridiculed by his or her
classmates as a result of the post. It is difficult to imagine how a court could
find that the constitutional right to anonymous speech would outweigh a
plaintiff's right to seek redress in such a case.
The primary goal of First Amendment free speech has been to avoid a
chilling effect on free expression and promote the exchange of ideas that are
socially beneficial.16 5 Posts like those in the high school hypothetical present
no social benefit, and imposing an inappropriately high standard upon a
plaintiff in such a case would promote destructive speech that could harm
the lives of its subjects victims, especially children and young adults who
spend much of their time on social media.' 66 Thus, non-political, noncommercial speech should be afforded the baseline form of protection and
thus the lowest level standard for revealing a defendant's identity. The
plaintiff friendly "Good Faith" standard from America Online is the most
67
exacting standard and would appropriately balance the interests at hand. 1
Applying the standards according to the type of speech ultimately
serves the ends ofjustice. Utilizing the "Type Method" will generally come
to the same results as a court would by balancing the interests; it just
substantially reduces the time-consuming process, the unpredictability, the
possibility that a defendant will be unfairly revealed, or the possibility that a
plaintiff will be unfairly denied the identity of a defendant.
CONCLUSION

The current manner in which courts across the nation decide whether a
defendant's identity should be revealed in an anonymous defamation suit is
inconsistent and often leads to unjust results. This is due to the oftensubjective value determination made by the courts regarding the particular
speech at issue in a given case. A court's ability to determine social value

28, 2017, 7:49 PM), https://perma.cc/PS7M-RHC2. It "largely rode to popularity based on
college-aged users dishing out secrets and being cruel to one another under the protection of
anonymity," but eventually shut down in 2017. Id.
164. See Rick A. Waltman, Note, Veiling Cyberbullies: FirstAmendment Protectionfor
Anonymity Per Se Strengthens the Voice of Online Predators,36 U. LA VERNE L. REv. 145,
146-47 (2014).
165. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,456 (Del. 2005).
166. See Waltman, supra note 165.
167. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 2000), rev 'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542
S.E.2d 377, 384-85 (Va. 2001).
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may lead to affording speech more or less protection than justice requires
and ultimately unfairly burdening one of the parties.
To prevent unjust results and inconsistent decisions, courts should
reject the balancing of interests based on the ad hoc valuation of the speech
and replace it with an approach that determines the standard a plaintiff must
meet to reveal the defendant's identity by referring solely to the type of
speech at issue and putting aside whether the speech qualifies as defamatory
in that instance. Under the "Type Method," the type of speech at issue will
be determined by who or what the speech addresses and what the content of
the message pertains to. This will create a streamlined approach that will
impose the highest standard to reveal the identity of a speaker of political
speech, an intermediate standard for the speaker of commercial speech, and
the base level "Good Faith" standard for the speaker of ordinary, nonpolitical, non-commercial speech. This approach will also create efficiency
in the courts, effectively protect the First Amendment right to anonymous
speech, and incentivize victimized plaintiffs to bring viable defamation
claims before the courts, instead of resorting to self-help or unjust defeat.
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